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The present study empirically investigates the relationship between financial distress and 
earnings management with reference to selected Italian companies, focusing on publicly listed, 
medium-size entities. Our sample consists of 38 firms, who were polled during the recession 
period, and afterwards from 2007 to 2017. Our study used discretionary accruals (DA) as a 
proxy for earnings management, and the cross-sectional modified Jones model has been applied 
for the estimate thereof. Altman’s Z-score was selected as the measure for financial distress. 
The study further considers the association between firms in financial distress and earning 
management changes during the recent global financial crisis. Through a multiple regression 
analysis, our study finds that highly distressed firms are more likely to engage in earnings 
management practices that financially sounder counterparts. Size is found to have a significant 
positive relationship with earnings management, implying that bigger firms are more inclined 
to accounting manipulation through DA. Profitability, on the other hand, showed negative 
correlation. The study found evidence of the effect of the financial crisis on this relationship 
between earnings management and financial distress, showing that distressed firms engage in 
income-increasing earnings management activities much more extensively during periods of 
financial crisis. The findings of the study have important implications for investors who want 
to make better investment decisions, as well as regulators, who are responsible for monitoring 
financial reporting quality. 
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O presente estudo investiga empiricamente a relação entre as dificuldades financeiras e a gestão 
dos lucros, com referência a empresas italianas selecionadas, cotadas em bolsa de tamanho 
médio. A nossa amostra consiste em 38 empresas, que foram sondadas entre 2007 e 2017. O 
estudo usa acréscimos discricionários como substituto da gestão dos lucros, e o modelo 
modificado de Jones foi aplicado à estimativa. O Z-score de Altman foi selecionado como 
medida para as dificuldades financeiras. O estudo considera ainda a associação entre empresas 
em dificuldades financeiras e modificações na gestão de lucros durante a crise financeira global. 
Através de uma análise de regressão múltipla, o nosso estudo descobre que empresas em 
dificuldades financeiras graves têm maior probabilidade de praticarem atos de gestão de lucros 
do que os seus pares em melhor situação financeira. Compreende-se que o tamanho da empresa 
tem um impacto positivo significativo na relação com a gestão de lucros: empresas de maior 
dimensão têm maior probabilidade de manipular a contabilidade através de acréscimos 
discricionários. A rentabilidade mostra uma correlação negativa. O estudo encontrou provas do 
efeito da crise financeira nesta relação entre gestão de lucros e dificuldades financeiras, 
mostrando que empresas em situações financeiras mais delicadas tomam parte em ações de 
gestão de lucros de forma muito mais intensa em períodos de crise financeira. As conclusões 
do presente estudo têm implicações importantes para investidores que queiram tomar melhores 
decisões de investimento, tal como para reguladores, que são responsáveis por monitorizar a 
qualidade da comunicação financeira. 
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The objective of the present paper is to investigate and provide further insight on an issue that, 
especially in this period following a severe financial crisis, has proven to be extremely 
important from a social and economic point of view: managerial earnings management 
behaviours of financially distressed firms. Corporate financial distress has long been a major 
concern not only for firms’ stakeholders, but also for governments that need to take measures 
to reduce possible systemic risks. Companies inevitably fall into financial distress because of a 
weakening in their performance and the consequences may be devastating, including 
bankruptcy filing or acquisition by other firms. Therefore, it becomes crucial for regulators and 
stakeholders to spot potential warning signs in the management of the firm before the conditions 
become irreversible. In case of firm bankruptcy, investors and creditors are of course the most 
directly affected but the impact can also be significant on the overall economic context. When 
facing financial distress, management has strong incentives to camouflage deteriorating 
financial indicators and to adopt accounting policies that boost the income of the firm. The 
necessity to report target earnings, cuts in management bonusses, loss of reputation, 
continuation in obtaining credit from banks, contractual negotiations and fear of losing their job 
positions are all probable reasons behind earnings management actions. For listed companies, 
the reactions from financial markets are traditionally one of the most important arguments 
behind these decisions and share price is strictly influenced by wide variations in earnings or 
lower estimates. Earnings manipulation can thus be an effective tool in the hands of managers 
to smooth out such variations (Barnea, et al., 1976).  Empirical evidence, however, does not 
lead to a definitive conclusion: some authors (Rosner, 2003) predict that ex-post bankrupt firms 
which did not appear distressed ex-ante, have significantly greater material income-increasing 
accruals magnitudes than control firms. Conversely, another author (DeAngelo, et al., 1994) 
documented that managers flatten earnings through negative abnormal accruals and 
discretionary write-offs, instead of inflating income. 
In the present paper, I analysed financial statements from publicly listed Italian companies, 
exclusively considering the components of the stock market index FTSE Italia Mid Cap as of 
31/12/2019. As consistent with previous studies, constituents belonging to finance and banking 
industries were excluded from the sample since their financial statements respond to different 
criteria and their accounting measures are not comparable with their nonfinancial 
counterparties, especially in terms of leverage. For similar reasons, companies from the real 
estate and insurance industries were omitted.  
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FTSE Italia Mid Cap companies have been chosen for the sample due to a number of reasons. 
My personal background and financial knowledge of the local market played a role. 
Additionally, the mid-cap segment represents, in our view, the best scenario to analyse the 
causal relationship in question, since it includes all kinds of possible companies, both in good 
shape and in distressed condition. With the purpose of assessing the quality of earnings and 
gauging whether distressed companies engage in earnings manipulation practices more than 
‘healthy companies’ the classic version of the Modified Jones model has been used.  
The motivations behind this study are multiple. Firstly, based on data in our possession, there 
has been an increasing trend of defaults in Italy in the period subsequent to the most recent 
financial crisis. Secondly, according to the studies presented in the literature review, the 
relationship between the level of distress and earnings management still appears to be 
inconclusive. Some studies report a positive association between these two variables, while in 
other cases the relationship is negative or remains unclear. Thirdly, to the best of our knowledge 
we believe this area of research has received relatively little attention and remains under-
researched, especially within the Italian context.  
Using a sample of mid-cap Italian-listed firms from 2007 to 2017, the research documents that 
firms in financial distress are more likely to engage in earnings manipulation policies than firms 
in a non-distressed situation. This result is consistent with our first research hypothesis. We also 
investigated the association between accounting manipulation and financial distressed 
condition one year before, but the results were not statistically significant. Finally, the paper 
indicates that through periods of financial crisis, such as occurred in 2008, distressed firms are 
more likely to manipulate their earnings upwards than other firms. 
With the present study we contribute to the literature studying the relationship between financial 
distress and earnings management. To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to 
investigate this correlation between the two variables for listed companies in Italy and it also 
the first evaluating whether the global financial crisis impacts this relationship. 
The paper is structured as follows: firstly, we will draw a brief overview of previous academic 
literature on the topics of earnings management, earnings manipulation and the relationship 
with financial distress. This will allow us to analyse the motivations that induce a firm in 
difficult conditions to disclose misreported financial statements, in order to support our research 
hypothesis. The third section illustrates the research design and methodology employed in the 
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study, while section four presents empirical results of our regression models and section fives 
draws the conclusions. 
 
2. Literature Review and development of hypotheses 
2.1 Literature Review 
Before moving to the methodology portion, we will focus on the concept of earnings 
management and how the literature evolved in this matter. Previous studies provide a clear 
distinction between earnings management and earnings manipulation. Earnings management 
comprise all the practices within the bounds of the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
(GAAP) with the purpose to adjust reported income to the desired level of earnings. These 
[accounting] actions of managing earnings are aimed at meeting analysts’ consensus or even 
encourage investors in buying additional shares. (Bartov, 1993), (Schipper, 1989), (Levitt, 
1998), (Rezaee, 2005). 
On the contrary, under the term ‘earnings manipulation’ are considered all accounting practices 
that lie outside the bounds of GAAP. This type of earnings overstatement mainly happens when 
accounting manipulation cannot conceal the distress condition a given firm is facing anymore. 
The difference between the two concepts lies precisely in the extent of the misstatement, as 
well as the intention of deceiving eventual stakeholders through alterations of financial 
adjustments. This intention of deceiving is more noticeable and prominent in earnings 
manipulation, than it is in the case of earnings management (Rezaee, 2005).  
Earnings manipulations, as well as earnings management, can be undertaken in different ways. 
In the case of management, businesses are especially prone to use discretionary accruals in 
order to shift earnings among different reporting periods to give the impression that the firm’s 
income does not fluctuate - this phenomenon is known as “earnings smoothing” (Palepu, 2016), 
(Dechow, 1994), (Holthausen & et al., 1995). Managers often achieve this by inflating net and 
asset sales, overproducing to report lower cost of goods sold or relaxing credit terms to boost 
revenues. 
The literature is particularly focused on developing tools that can detect the practice of earnings 
manipulation in advance, by identifying and predicting a firm’s discretionary accruals in 
particular (Healy, 1985), (McNichols & Wilson, 1988), (Jones, 1991). In this regard, different 
accrual-based models have been developed and tested in order to establish which model would 
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be most effective in revealing earnings manipulation practices. The Healey model, although 
criticized by researchers for its inefficiency in estimating discretionary accruals (Young, 1999), 
tests for earnings management in relation to bonus schemes associated with a firm’s 
performance. It does so by comparing mean total accruals scaled by lagged total assets and 
predicting that earnings management exist in each period. Healy (1985) estimated the 




Where NDA stands for estimated nondiscretionary accruals, TA for Total accruals scaled by 
lagged total assets and t = 1, 2… T is a year subscript for years included in the estimation period, 
while t is a year in the event period. The results of the model suggest that (1) accrual policies 
made by the management are linked to income-reporting incentives of their bonus schemes, and 
(2) changes made in accounting procedures are connected with adoption of or a change in the 
bonus plan.  
 
DeAngelo (DeAngelo, 1986) aims to test for earnings management by first computing 
differences in total accruals. In this case, the last period’s total accruals scaled by lagged total 
assets are used as measure of nondiscretionary accruals.  
The DeAngelo Model for NDA is built as:  
𝑁𝐷𝐴 = 𝑇𝐴    
It can be considered as a special instance of the Healey model, in which the estimation period 
for nondiscretionary accruals is restricted to the previous year’s observation. A common trait 
shared by the two models is the use of total accruals from the estimation period as a proxy for 
expected nondiscretionary accruals. If these nondiscretionary accruals remain constant over 
time with discretionary ones with an average of zero in the estimation period, both models 
convey nondiscretionary accruals without error. If, however, nondiscretionary accruals do 
change over time, discretionary accruals will be measured with less accuracy.  
In order to establish which of these two models is more suitable, an analysis of the time-series 
process that generates the accruals has to be made. If nondiscretionary accruals follow a white-
noise process around a constant mean, the Healey model is more appropriate. If they follow a 
random-walk pattern, the second model is preferable. Both models are based on the assumption 
that nondiscretionary accruals remain constant over time but, according to the literature, the 
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nature of the accrual accounting process imposes that the level of nondiscretionary accruals 
should vary in response to changes in economic conditions (Kaplan, 1985). Not considering the 
effect of economic nondiscretionary accruals will produce inflated standard errors due to the 
exclusion of relevant uncorrelated variables.  
Jones (Jones, 1991) later built a model which loosens the constant nondiscretionary accruals 
assumption. The model evolved from the previous literature since it attempts to control for the 
effect of changes that may occur in nondiscretionary accruals due to changes in the firm’s 
economic conditions. The Jones Model for nondiscretionary accruals in the event year is: 
NDAt = α1 (1/At-1) + α2 (ΔREVt) + α3 (PPEt) 
In this case:  
REVt = revenues in year t less revenues in year t-1 scaled by lagged total assets. 
PPEt = gross property plant and equipment in year t scaled by lagged total assets. 
At-1 = total assets at t-1. 
α1 α2 α3 = firm-specific parameters.  
 
The firm-specific parameters are estimated through the following model in the estimation 
period:  
TAt = α1 (1/At-1) + α2 (ΔREVt) + α3 (PPEt) + ετ 
 
In this case:  
α1 α2 α3 are the OLS estimates of the coefficients.  
TA stands for total accruals scaled by total assets.  
 
The Jones Model is based on the important premise that revenues are nondiscretionary in either 
the estimation period or the event period. In the paper, Jones recognises that reported revenues 
are not completely exogenous and may be influenced by managers’ attempts to reduce earnings. 
For example, if we consider a case in which management uses its discretion to accrue revenues 
at the end of the fiscal year when cash has not yet been received, this will lead to an increase in 
revenues and total accruals, through an increase in the receivables part.  
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This shortcoming of the model causes the estimate of earnings management to be biased toward 
zero. This flaw has been overcome with a modification to the original Jones Model. The 
adjustment is designed to get rid of the tendency of the Jones Model to compute incorrect 
discretionary accruals when revenues are discretionary. In the modified model, NDA are 
estimated during the event period as follow: 
TAt / At-1 = α1 (1/At-1) + α2 (ΔREVt - ΔRECt)/ At-1 + α3 (PPEt/ At-1) + ετ 
In this case:  
TAt = total accruals in year t 
At-1 = total assets in year t − 1 
ΔREVt = change in revenues from year t − 1 to year t 
ΔRECt = change in net receivables from year t − 1 to year t  
PPEt = property, plant and equipment in year t 
The only difference between the two models is related to the fact that in the modified version 
the change in revenues is adjusted for the variation in net receivables during the event period. 
The assumption here is that all changes in credit sales in the event period result from earnings 
management. The variation in the assumptions leads to a different estimate of the earnings 
management, which is no longer biased toward zero for samples where earnings management 
took place as a consequence of revenue management.  
For our empirical analysis, the modified Jones Model version has been considered. (Dechow, 
1996) finds the modified Jones model to be more robust than the first and indeed it is widely 
used in the estimation of DA. 
According to the literature, there are multiple reasons that can induce a company to manipulate 
their earnings figures. Previous studies (Koch, 2002) tried to investigate the incentives to issue 
inaccurate disclosures and misreport earnings by the management. Artificial inflation of firm 
value in the short term, employment concerns, bonuses and implicit contracts, contingent equity 
like stock options are all reasons that lead to these accounting behaviours. Furthermore, a firm’s 
management may misreport earnings because of the large costs for some stakeholders that are 
associated with unravelling financial manipulation, or simply to avoid credit problems related 
to the financial distress condition.  
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Many studies in the literature focus strongly on the ‘bonus hypothesis’ and the ‘debt hypothesis’ 
(Zimmerman & Watts, 2006), (Christie, 1990). Christie, for example, proved that variables like 
managerial compensation, leverage, size, dividends and constraints on interest coverage have 
explanatory power across different studies and these are statistically significant in explaining 
discretionary accounting choices. Still, the ‘debt hypothesis’ remains one of the most significant 
aspects in understanding the earnings misreporting practice. Indeed, the management of 
companies that face financial distress has strong incentives to disclose misleading information 
about accounting choices.  
(Ettredge, 2010) considered the degree to which earnings manipulation underlies misstated 
financial statements and the evidence suggests that a pattern of aggressive accounting 
manipulation can be detected several years prior to identified fraud. A similar pattern precedes 
non-fraudulent misstatements. Some disincentives such as contingent equity, bonuses and 
implicit contracts, as well as management employment concerns, are less effective when a 
company is facing a financial distress condition.  
(Koch, 2002) examined the relation between financial distress, bias in forecasting, and the 
credibility of voluntary earnings forecasts made by management. While the previous literature 
suggested that penalties to overstated numbers or “cooking the books” are in general sufficient 
measures to discourage managers from issuing intentionally biased forecast, he investigated the 
special case of financially distressed firms and found that management earnings forecasts issued 
by firms in financial distress (1) exhibit greater upward bias; (2) are viewed as less credible 
than forecasts made by non-distressed firms in the financial community - good news forecasts 
from distressed firms are ignored, while bad news forecasts produce an exaggerated analyst 
reaction; (3) display a positive correlation between the degree of over-optimism and the severity 
of the financial distress condition.  
(Smith, et al., 2001) previously examined the use of income increasing policy choices by listed 
Australian companies during a period of substantial economic downturn, caused by the stock 
market crash of October 1987. The aim of the paper was to observe if both distress or 
subsequent failure of a firm can explicate the presence of the use of income increasing policies. 
His research investigates in particular whether financially distressed firms are more inclined to 
use such policies than less distressed ones. While previous research supports the idea that 
managers of firms in difficult conditions tend to lift their reported income eluding default on 
loan agreements, they interestingly found that the use of income increasing policy choice does 
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not rise with higher levels in the financial distress indicator. Only firms that were classified as 
‘distressed’ which did not fail in the short term tend to significantly increase their earnings 
through manipulations in accounting policy, while income increasing practices in distressed 
firms which fail in a short period of time are not more likely than in healthy firms. 
(Habib A., 2013) investigated earnings management policies of financially distressed firms in 
New Zealand from 2000 to 2011, aiming to find if these accounting practices are related to the 
global financial crisis and examining the market pricing of discretionary accruals during the 
financial crisis period. According to his findings, financial distress condition provides 
motivation for earnings manipulation and in particular financially distressed firms engaged in 
income-decreasing earnings management practices. This relationship does not change during 
the global financial crisis. Even though the direction of earnings management might be income-
increasing or income-decreasing, both situations are perceived as hazardous because this aspect 
blurs the real performance of the firm and misleads investors and stakeholders. 
(Bisogno, 2015) finally examined the association between financial distress and earnings 
management in the Italian context of private companies of small and medium size (SMEs). It 
was documented that unlisted firms under financial distress tend to be more involved in 
accounting manipulation practices, mostly through sales inflation. 
 
2.2 Earnings Management and Financial Distress: Research Hypotheses  
In order to examine the relationship between earnings management and financial distress we 
test the following hypothesis: 
H1: Firms in financial distress are more likely to engage in earnings management and 
accounting manipulation practices, mainly by means of discretionary accruals, than their 
counterparts that are not financially distressed.  
The hypothesis will be tested by means of an OLS regression with the dependent variable being 
the discretionary accruals of the firms as a proxy for the level of earnings management - we 
assume that high and positive discretionary accruals correspond to aggressive accounting 
practices conducted by management, while negative discretionary accruals indicate a more 
conservative approach and earnings management action becomes less likely. The main test 
variable in this model is the Altman’s Z-score, considered as a proxy for the level of financial 
distress of the firm. Based on our first assumption we expect the financial distress status to be 
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positively correlated with the dependent variable, which means that financially distressed firms 
are more likely to engage in earnings manipulation than healthy companies. To test this 
hypothesis, we decided to use the Z-score as a dummy variable. Financially distressed firms are 
considered those with a Z-score lower than 1.8, while firms in solid financial positions have 
higher values (dummy coded 1 if the firm is financially distressed, and 0 otherwise). Together 
with the main variable, will be selected a series of control variables like size, leverage, 
profitability and growth, which are commonly used in the literature to explain the relationship 
between the parameters considered. These will be explained in more detail in the methodology 
section. 
H2: Firms are more likely to engage in earnings management practices if they were previously 
involved in financial distressed condition. 
Here we assume that firms that already find themselves in a financially distressed condition 
may have clearer incentives to manipulate their earnings in the immediate future as a last resort 
to hide unsatisfactory financial results, in order to avoid reputational risks, a loss of competitive 
position, and negative impact on management’s stock-based compensation. To the best of our 
knowledge, this association has not yet been tested in the literature, especially as it concerns 
the Italian market, and can provide further insights into the relationship between earnings 
management and financial distress. To test the above-mentioned hypothesis and measure the 
strength of the relationship between the two variables, we used as test variable the Z-score at 
time t-1 and discretionary accruals at time t. If the relation is positive this leads to the conclusion 
that companies, once in financial distress, start to manage their earnings as a way to conceal 
their financial condition. Again, control variables such as size, leverage, profitability and 
growth have been added to the regression. 
 
H3: The global financial crisis period influences the association between firms in financial 
distress and earning management. 
Our third and final hypothesis examines whether the most recent global financial crisis has an 
impact on the relationship we are analysing. To test this hypothesis, we add to the first 
regression equation a dummy variable financial crisis (coded 1 if the firm year observations 
were taken from the financial crisis period between 2008 and 2012, zero otherwise) and the 
interaction term between this variable with the usual Altman Z-score.  
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According to the analytical model of (Strobl, 2008), earnings management is predominant 
during periods of economic boom. Other studies (Cohen & Zarowin, 2007) found evidence for 
this proposition as well. When businesses prosper, firms normally experience high levels of 
earnings and investors assume that some of these companies are induced to manipulate their 
accounting figures. In difficult times, on the other way, the incentive for management to 
manipulate earnings should be lower since investors already anticipate many firms to manage 
their earnings and therefore put less stress on the reports.  
It may also be noted that an economic crisis should, according to conventional wisdom, 
persuade management to adopt Big Bath accounting practices: i.e. earnings management 
techniques whereby net income is displayed as even worse than what actually is in order to 
artificially inflate future earnings. The reasoning behind this is quite straightforward: since the 
firm already looks to be in a bad situation, the aim is to show the figures as bad as possible. In 
this way, writing off assets or expenses and taking a ‘bath’ in the worst year secures positive 
figures in the following years with benefits for management bonus compensation. 
 
3. Research Design & Methodology 
3.1 Sample description and data 
The sample for this study consists of 38 publicly listed Italian companies and the study period 
ranges from 2007 to 2017. Specifically, firms considered are classified as “mid cap” and the 
components of the FTSE Italia Mid Cap Index as of 31 December 2019 have been selected. The 
reason to consider exclusively mid cap companies is not fortuitous: the segment represents in 
our opinion the best scenario to investigate earning management and financial distress 
companies since it comprises many different kinds of firms - from those facing critical financial 
conditions, which have been excluded from the FTSE MIB Index, to those in excellent financial 
conditions that are experiencing a growth phase. Table 1 shows the industry-wide distribution 
of sample firms. As evident from the table, industrials and consumer industries are prevalent. 
We begin with an initial sample of 418 firm-year observations from 2007 to 2017 with available 
data to estimate the regression equations. Consistent with previous studies, we excluded from 
our sample companies operating in finance and banking industries because their financial 
statements respond to different rules and their accounting measures cannot be compared with 
those recorded by companies belonging to other industries. Certain other industries, such as 
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insurance and real estate and firms with missing or incomplete data have been excluded. We 
lost 38 firm-year observations because accruals variables in our equations needed to be deflated 
with lagged total assets data. We derived a final usable sample of 380 firm-year observations 
from 2008 to 2017. The data for the variables used in the study have been collected from the 
Osiris Database, a global corporate database provided by Bureau Van Dijk, and from Thomson 
Reuters Eikon for accounting data not available in the database.  
 
 
Table 1. Industry-wide distribution of sample firms based on the industry classification 
benchmark (ICB) 
Industry          ICB Code    No. of Firms 
Oil & Gas 0001 4 
Basic Materials 1000 1 
Industrials 2000 15 
Consumer Goods 3000 4 
Consumer Services 5000 6 
Telecommunications 6000 1 
Utilities 7000 4 
Technology 9000 3 
  
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
3.2 Measurement of financial distress: Altman’s Z-score 
Between the independent variables included in our models, the Altman’s Z-Score is the one of 
primary interest as it measures the firm’s level of financial distress. Even though the Z-score 
model was developed decades ago in 1968, it is the most widely used in the academic literature 
as a measure of financial distress and still accurate in assessing the overall financial health of 
the firm  (Charitou & Lambertides, 2011), (Altman, 2017).  
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To predict whether the firm has a high probability of becoming insolvent or not, the score is 
based on five financial ratios: profitability, leverage, liquidity, solvency, and activity. Higher 
levels of the score denote a lower level of financial distress, whereas a lower score indicates a 
higher level of distress. Normally, an Altman Z-Score below 1.8 suggests a company might be 
headed for financial distress and eventual bankruptcy, while a score closer to 2.99 or higher 
implies the firm is financially strong.  
It is estimated as follows: 
Z - score = 1.2 (WC/TA) + 1.4 (RE/TA) + 3.3 (EBIT/TA) + 0.6 (MVE/TL) + 1.0 (Sales/TA) 
In this case:  
WC = working capital, that is, current assets – current liabilities  
RE = retained earnings 
EBIT = earnings before interest and tax 
MVE = market value of equity 
TL = total liabilities  
TA = total assets 
The first ratio, working capital over total assets, is a measure of the net liquid assets of the 
company relative to its total capitalisation. Working capital here is expressed as the difference 
between current assets and current liabilities. Generally, a firm facing operating losses will 
present shrinking current assets in relation to total assets. Comparing this liquidity ratio with 
current and quick ratios, this one proved to be the most valuable. Working capital over total 
assets explicitly considers liquidity and size characteristics.  
Retained earnings over total assets is a measure of cumulative profitability over time. It is one 
of the two ratios introduced by Altman; the other is the use of market value of equity instead of 
the book value. The ratio implicitly considers the age of the firm due to its cumulative nature. 
A relatively young firm will show a lover RE/TA ratio as it takes time to increase its cumulative 
profits. Therefore, it may be stated that a young firm has a higher chance of being classified as 
bankrupt compared to another. But this is precisely how it works in real situations. The younger 
the firm, the higher the incidence of failure. 
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Earnings before interest and taxes over total assets ratio is a measure of the true productivity or 
profitability of the assets of the firm and it is not affected by any tax or leverage factors. Since 
the firm’s survival is dependent on the earning power of its assets, this ratio appears to be 
particularly suitable to determine insolvency. 
Market value of equity (includes the combined market value of all shares, preferred and 
common) divided by the total liabilities shows the decrease in value of the assets before the 
liabilities exceed the assets and the firm goes bankrupt. The ratio adds a market value dimension 
to the model that other studies did not previously include. The debt to equity ratio, which is 
widely used nowadays to measure financial leverage, is the reciprocal of this ratio. 
The sales over total assets ratio is the standard capital turnover ratio and expresses the ability 
of assets to generate revenues. It assesses management’s capability in dealing with the 
competitive conditions a firm face. Because of its unique relationship to other variables in the 
model, the ratio is one of the variables that most contribute to the overall discriminating ability 
of the model, even though there is a wide variation among industries regarding asset turnover. 
 
3.3 Measurement of Earnings Management 
As previously mentioned in the literature review section, different models have been developed 
for the estimation of discretionary accruals, such as those by (Healy, 1985) (DeAngelo, 1986), 
(Jones, 1991), (Dechow, 1996) and the modified Jones model. Both the Jones model and 
modified Jones model has been extensively considered in the academic literature as effective 
models in the estimation of discretionary accruals (DA), considered as a proper proxy to 
measure earnings management. According to Dechow, the modified version delivers more 
powerful results than the original model. For this reason and because it relaxes the assumptions 
about the value of sales, the present article decides to adopt the modified Jones model to first 
compute the discretionary accruals. 
 
First, total accruals have been calculated with the following formula: 
Tacct = ∆CAt - ∆Casht - ∆CLt + ∆DCLt - DEPt 
In this case:  
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𝑇acct = Total accruals in year 𝑡, 
∆𝐶𝐴t = Change in current assets in year 𝑡, 
∆𝐶𝑎𝑠ht = Change in cash and cash equivalents in year 𝑡, 
∆𝐶𝐿t = Change in current liabilities in year 𝑡, 
∆𝐷𝐶𝐿t = Change in short term debt included in current liabilities in year t,  
𝐷𝐸𝑃t = Depreciation and amortization expense in year 𝑡. 
According to the literature total accruals can be derived in two ways: by following either a 
balance sheet-based approach or a cash flow statement-based approach. The former formulates 
the total accruals as described above, the latter computes total accruals as the difference 
between net income and cash from operating activities. Healey and Jones used the balance 
sheet-based approach in their studies and therefore to be consistent in our research we decided 
to adopt the same approach. 
Secondly, total accruals computed in year t then serve in the estimation of the modified Jones 
model, which is defined below: 
TAcct /At-1 = α1 (1/At-1) + α2 (∆REVt – ΔRECt)/At-1 + α3(PPEt/At-1) + εt 
In this case: 
TAcct is total accruals in year t 
At-1 is total assets in year t – 1 
ΔREVt is the change in revenues from year t − 1 to year t 
ΔRECt is the change in net receivables from year t − 1 to year  
PPEt is property, plant and equipment plus long term deferred expenses in year t.  
εt is the error term in year t. 
Total accruals include variations in working capital elements, such as receivables, inventory 
and payables, which are influenced by changes in revenues (∆REVt). In order to control changes 
in non-discretionary accruals determined by altered external conditions, we decided to include 
property, plant and equipment, long-term deferred expenses, as well as changes in revenues in 
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the model. Sales are also present in the model because this component is often subject to 
management manipulation as a way to show a sounder financial performance. The property, 
plant and equipment variable (PPEt), is necessary to control for the portion of total accruals 
related to non-discretionary depreciation expenses. 
The usual approach used in the literature for the estimation of discretionary accruals through a 
regression model is to consider it as the unexplained portion of total accruals. Since total 
accruals can be expressed into a discretionary and a non-discretionary component, the error 
term in the previous equation represents the estimated discretionary accruals (DA) component. 
The reason why all variables of the model are scaled by the lagged value of total assets is to 
reduce heteroskedasticity, which arises in statistics when the standard errors of a variable are 
non-constant over a specific amount of time. 
 
3.4 Regression Models and Research Variables 
The relationship between earnings management and financial distress for Italian mid cap firms 
is investigated using multiple regression analysis. First, we derived the following regression 
equation after controlling for the known determinants of earnings management in order to test 
our first hypothesis: 
DAi,t = ß0 + ß1 Z SCOREi,t + ß2 SIZEi,t + ß3 LEVERAGEi,t + ß4 PROF + ß5 GROWTH + εt  (1) 
In this case:  
DA = DA calculated using the Modified Jones model 
Z SCORE = Altman Z-score as dummy variable. Coded 1 if < 1.8, 0 otherwise 
SIZE = Firm size measured as the natural logarithm of total assets 
LEVERAGE = The ratio of long-term debt to total assets 
PROFITABILITY = The ratio of net income to total assets (Return on Assets), in % points 
GROWTH = The ratio of market value of equity over book values of assets 
 
Together with the Altman Z-score dummy, the regressions present a series of different control 
variables which are also used in other studies to explain the relationship of our interest. Indeed, 
to ensure the effect of our independent variable on the discretionary accruals is not influenced 
by external factors, other variables must be kept constant.   
 23 
These control variables are described as follows: 
SIZE, which is computed as the natural logarithm of total assets. According to other studies 
(Habib A., 2013), (Chen Y., 2010) the firm size is likely to have an impact on earnings 
management and therefore needs to be treated as control variable. Bigger firms not only have 
access to better controlling systems and first-class quality auditing services, but are also more 
concerned regarding the loss of reputation that can follows in case earnings management is 
detected than their smaller counterparts. For these reasons, it is assumed that firms with higher 
levels of total assets will engage in earnings management practices less, and that this 
phenomenon is more pervasive in small firms. Conversely, some authors state that larger firms 
are more likely to manage earnings than small sized firms. This can be the consequence of 
dealing with more pressure from financial markets if bigger firms have to meet or beat analysts’ 
expectations (Barton J., 2002), higher bargaining power with auditors and consequent 
negotiation in waiving earnings management attempts (Nelson, et al., 2002), more room to 
manipulate given the wider array of accounting treatments available and finally the possibility 
to lower political costs.  
LEVERAGE: computed as long-term debt over total assets, expresses the leverage ratio of firms 
in the sample. This variable is expected to be positively correlated with discretionary accruals. 
Previous studies showed that as the relative level of debt rises, a firm is more likely to have 
tighter accounting constraints and therefore frequent accounting manipulation is often 
associated with firms characterised by high leverage (Press & Weintrop, 1990), (DeFond & 
Jimbalvo, 1994). Other studies (Sweeney, 1994) found that managers of firms approaching 
default conditions respond with income-increasing accounting changes. 
PROF: profitability of the firm measured by return on assets (net income/total assets). 
(Nasuhiyah & Al., 1994) found that firms with lower profit margins hold earnings above certain 
levels in order to avoid the risk of reducing the firm’s value resulting from earnings fluctuation.  
Firms with low profit margins may therefore resort to earnings management in order to avoid 
this potentiality. (Chen & Huang, 2010) also choose return on assets as a control variable to 
proxy firms’ profitability. 
GROWTH, which is the ratio between market value of equity and book value of assets, has 
demonstrated to have an influence on discretionary accruals. (Skinner, 1993) argues that high-
growth firms are more likely to engage in opportunistic reporting behaviour. (Robin & Wu, 
2012) examined how firm growth has an effect on the pricing of discretionary accruals and their 
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empirical tests reveal that the pricing is not significantly different between high and low growth 
firms. However, they also found that in high growth firms, positive discretionary accruals are 
priced to a greater extent in comparison with low-growth counterparts, while negative 
discretionary accruals are priced to a smaller extent. It is argued that that management of high 
growth firms may use discretionary accruals as a possible mechanism for signalling future 
performance of the firms. 
To test if firms are more likely to engage in earnings management practices because they were 
previously involved in financial distressed condition, the following regression has been tested: 
DAi,t = ß0 + ß1 Z SCOREi,t-1 + ß2 SIZEi,t + ß3 LEVERAGEi,t + ß4 PROF + ß5 GROWTH + εt  (2) 
Dependent variable is discretionary accruals (DAt). The first model considers the Altman’s Z-
score (Z-score) as a measure of financial distress at time t, while the second model uses the 
same explanatory variable but at time t-1 to see if firms, once they were in a financial distress 
condition in the previous year, go on to manage their earnings in year t. This type of analysis 
can be extremely useful for both regulators and stakeholders. In fact, if a positive correlation is 
found, it can be postulated that a delayed manipulation of earnings could conceal the negative 
effects of a distressed condition. 
Finally, to test the incremental effect of the 2008 financial crisis on the relationship earnings 
management and financial distress, we added two variables to our first regression model: 
DAi,t = ß0 + ß1 Z SCOREi,t + ß2 FCi,t + ß3 [FC*Z SCORE]i,t + ß4 SIZEi,t + ß5 LEVERAGEi,t + 
ß6 PROF + ß7 GROWTH + εt  (3) 
 
4.  Empirical results 
Before moving forward with the results of our OLS regressions, it is important to analyse the 
correlation matrix in order to check eventual multicollinearity between the variables of our 
regression equations. As the correlation table shows, none of the explanatory variables of our 
regressions presents correlation coefficients close to one in absolute value. According to the 
literature, only coefficients higher than 0.8 indicate significant multicollinearity between 
variables. Further, a variance inflation factor (VIF) has been calculated for all our models and 
it always showed a value close to two. We can therefore assume that multicollinearity between 




Table 2  
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Mean  Median Std. Deviation Min Max 
Discretionary 
Accruals 
.0176430 0.013815 .06529455 -0.44341 0.29367 
Size  14.4344 14.395 1.30562 11.75 17.51 
Leverage  .1943 0.165 .14064 0 0.61 
Profitability  4.4442 4.87 6.70199 -50.49 28.17 
Growth  1.7761 1.335 1.61723 -1.08 14.15 
Z-score  .5421 1.72 .49888 -0.48 9.9 
 
 Panel B: Correlation analysis 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 DA (1) 1.000      
Size (2) .142*** 1.000     
Leverage (3) .014 .522*** 1.000    
Profitability 
(4) 
-.017 -.146*** -.077 1.000   
Growth (5) .063 -.151*** -.089* .337*** 1.000  
Z-score (6) .089* -.295*** -.415*** .596*** .420*** 1.000 
 
Panel A of the previous table contains the descriptive statistics of the independent variables 
used in our regression analysis while panel B reports the correlation analysis between these 
variables. From the descriptive statistics panel, a positive mean in DA indicates that, on average, 
firms in financial distress engage in income-increasing practices. Negative minimum value of 
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DA (-0.443) implies that firms also employ income-decreasing earnings management. The 
profitability of the sample firms presents a large standard deviation and it is the variable with 
the widest range between the minimum and the maximum value. This denotes that the ROA 
varies extensively across the sample firms. Wide changes across sample firms can be seen in 
respect of growth as well. 
To better understand the strength of the linear relationship, we tested the significance of the 
correlation coefficients for the model. DA is positively correlated with Size (correlation 
coefficient significant at 1 percent level), which implies that bigger firms are more inclined to 
income-increasing earnings management practices. Our test variable Z-score, having a 
correlation coefficient of 0.089, is slightly positive but still significantly correlated at 10 percent 
level with DA. Z-Score is then strongly negative correlated with Size and Leverage and 
positively correlated with profitability and growth. All these coefficients are significant at 1 
percent level. 
Table 3 reports the outputs for the relationship between discretionary accruals and financial 
distress throughout the timeframe considered. For our first regression in which Altman Z-score 
represents a proxy for the level of financial distress of the firms, our results reveal a positive 
and statistically significant relationship between the explanatory variable Z-score and the level 
of accruals of the firm. The coefficient is statistically significant at 1 percent level. The low 
adjusted R square (0.050) may indicate that the model does not fit well the data but these values 
are consistent with what calculated in previous studies if the Jones model has been applied in 
the computation of discretionary accruals (Siregar & Utama, 2008).  
A positive standardized coefficient of the dummy variable Z-score implies that firms facing 
financial distress are more likely to adjust their earnings with the intention to improve the 
appearance of their financial statements. Therefore, we can confirm our first hypothesis, which 
assumes that firms in financial distress tend to be more involved in earnings management and 
accounting manipulation practices than firms with a stronger financial situation. This result 
suggests that companies in this distressed condition will presumably aim to conceal extreme 
levels of debt and poor results as a way to avoid further implications the firm may have with 
regulators and stakeholders. These results are consistent with what other authors discovered 
(Bisogno, 2015). 
The second variable in the table, SIZE, also presents a level of significance at 1% and a positive 
coefficient, as expected. The implication here is that larger firms tend to employ higher levels 
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of earnings management, which should be reasonable, as these enterprises have more 
discretionary room. This fact appears to be consistent with what (Habib A., 2013) found in his 
research but inconsistent with the result of another paper (Bhattacharya, 2001), which found 
that smaller firms may show more frequent earnings manipulation practices because of higher 
levels of information asymmetry and lower requirements in terms of financial disclosure. 
The third variable, LEVERAGE showing a slightly negative coefficient, is not statistically 
significant. This result is in a certain way surprising because we should expect that high 
leverage firms are more likely to manipulate earnings over time in order to avoid debt covenant 
violations (Sweeney, 1994). Therefore, according to our model, we can assert that the level of 
a firm’s leverage does not have a significant impact on the level of earnings manipulation and 
cannot be considered as a good predictor of earnings management behaviours. 
Finally, the fourth variable we want to discuss is a firm’s PROFITABILITY, measured by 
means on Return on Assets. This factor, which is statistically significant at 10 % level, shows 
a negative relationship with discretionary accruals and implies that less profitable firms tend to 
engage in earnings management actions in a way that hides poor short-term results, achieves 
target earnings and consequently reaches bonus compensation for the management.  
Table 3 – Association between discretionary accruals (DA) and financial distress 
***, **, *, Statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance. T-statistics in 
parentheses; modified Jones discretionary accruals (DA) model is used to estimate earnings 
manipulation. 
 
DAi,t = ß0 + ß1 Z SCOREi,t + ß2 SIZEi,t + ß3 LEVERAGEi,t + ß4 PROFt + ß5 GROWTHt + εt  
 
Variables Standard error Standardized 
coefficient ß 
t value p-value 
 Intercept .042 -.140 -3.318 .001*** 
Size  .003 .195 3.271 .001*** 
Leverage  .030 -.013 -.203 .839 
Profitability  .001 -.122 -1.871 .062* 
Growth  .002 .052 .918 .359 
Z-score  .004 .192 2.598 .010*** 
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R2 .050    
Observations 380    
 
In the regression model 2, we want to analyse the relationship between financial distress and 
earnings management with a different timeframe. Z-score variable of the previous year is used. 
Here, our results are not statistically significant in terms of Z-score and thus we cannot consider 
this variable as a good predictor of earnings management practices. However, further studies 
with a higher number of observations are needed to test and verify this relationship. For variable 
SIZE the coefficient is found to be statistically significant at 1 per cent level, which is consistent 
with our previous and overall results. 
Table 4 – Association between DA and financial distress one year behind 
***, **, *, Statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance. T-statistics in 
parentheses; modified Jones discretionary accruals (DA) model is used to estimate earnings 
manipulation. 
DAi,t = ß0 + ß1 Z SCOREi,t-1 + ß2 SIZEi,t + ß3 LEVERAGEi,t + ß4 PROFt + ß5 GROWTHt + εt  
 
Variables Standard error Standardized 
coefficient ß 
t value p-value 
 Intercept .043 -.127 -2.993 .003*** 
Size  .003 .196 3.246 .001*** 
Leverage  .030 -.062 -.966 .335 
Profitability  .001 -.049 -.814 .416 
Growth  .002 .085 1.543 .124 
Z-score  .003 .055 .826 .410 
Adjusted R2 .035    
Observations 380    
 
In table 5 we examine the relationship between earnings management and financial distress 
including in the regression a financial crisis dummy variable containing firm-year observations 
from 2008 to 2012, years in which the financial crisis affected the most Italian companies. To 
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test the incremental effect of global financial crisis on distressed firms’ discretionary accruals, 
this FC dummy has been combined with the Z-score. Results reveal that the Z-score, taken 
alone, does not show a significant relationship with our dependent variable but if we take into 
account the coefficients of the financial crisis dummy and the incremental effect FC * Z-score 
we reach statistically significant results. FC dummy, per se, is statistically significant at 5 
percent level, while the combined variable is significant at 10 percent. The combined coefficient 
on (Z-score + FC * Z-score) is 0.451, a value 2.5 times higher than the ß coefficient of Z-score. 
This result highlights two facts: 1) a positive sign in the coefficient shows that firms in financial 
distress tend to manipulate their earnings more than non-financial distressed counterparts, 
which corroborated our first hypothesis; 2) distressed firms engage in income-increasing 
earnings management activities much more in periods of financial crisis. 
Income-increasing earnings management is often seen in the literature as a potential red flag in 
the evaluation of financial reports because these are often measures used by listed firms to 
present the appearance of consistent income, smooth quarterly earnings fluctuations, and show 
to the market and to stakeholders a stronger financial position. 
Between the other control variables of the model, SIZE and PROFITABILITY are the ones 
with statistically significant results. The bigger the size, the higher the level of DA, while the 















Table 5 – Impact of the global financial crisis on the association between discretionary 
accruals and financial distress 
Notes: ***, **, *, Statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance. T-
statistics in parentheses; modified Jones discretionary accruals (DA) model is used to 
estimate earnings manipulation. 
 
DAi,t = ß0 + ß1 Z SCOREi,t + ß2 FCi,t + ß3 [FC*Z SCORE]i,t + ß4 SIZEi,t + ß5 LEVERAGEi,t +    
ß6 PROF + ß7 GROWTH + εt  (3) 
 
Variables Standard error Standardised 
coefficient ß 
t value p-value 
 Intercept .042 -.133 -3.131 .002*** 
Size  .003 .199 3.337 .001*** 
Leverage  .030 -.011 -.171 .864 
Profitability  .001 -.127 -1.940 .053* 
Growth  .002 .050 .874 .383 
Z-score  .004 .129 1.629 .104 
Financial 
Crisis dummy 
.013 -.211 -2.226 .027** 
FC * Z score .006 .193 1.959 .051* 
Adjusted R2 .045    









This paper provides evidence regarding the relationship between earnings management choices 
and financial distress condition in listed Italian firms with medium market capitalisation during 
the decade after the 2008 crisis. The study also considers whether this relationship changed 
during the global financial crisis. Based on the statistical results of our models we find that 
firms in financial distress, which are usually characterised by high leverage ratios, are more 
likely to disclose misleading account statements than financially ‘healthy’ firms. There are 
several reasons behind these actions: first and foremost, the ‘necessity’ to please analyst and 
shareholders’ forecasts and consequently to not affect the share price. Secondly, management 
remuneration is often tied to the firm’s accounting performance and therefore it is in managers’ 
interest to exaggerate accounting performance. This is often referred as the management 
compensation hypothesis (or ‘bonus plan’). Lastly, managers may report higher earnings in 
order to show better a liquidity position and avoid debt covenants violations (debt hypothesis). 
Among the control variables, Size has a significant positive relationship with earnings 
manipulation, implying that bigger firms have more incentives to manage earnings through DA. 
Profitability has a significant but negative relationship with DA. Finally, our last model shows 
that the level of accounting manipulation in the years of financial crisis is higher for distressed 
firms compared to firms in better financial conditions.  
We believe the outcomes of our study have important implications not only for current and 
prospect investors but also for policy makers and regulators, who are responsible for monitoring 
financial reporting quality. Distorted accounting figures certainly mislead investors and make 
it harder to carry out a correct valuation of the future performance. Although our findings 
delivered interesting results, this study has some limitations. Firstly, a larger sample would 
probably provide more accurate results and a smaller margin of error. Secondly, due to 
unavailable data for the sample our models do not include cash flow as a control variable, but 
according to the earnings management literature this factor is a significant indicator of financial 
distress. Thirdly, expanding the analysis to a broader geographical base would probably deliver 
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Table 6 – ANOVA results - First regression model 
 DAi,t = ß0 + ß1 Z SCOREi,t + ß2 SIZEi,t + ß3 LEVERAGEi,t + ß4 PROFt + ß5 GROWTHt + εt  
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression .081 5 .016 3.940 .002 
Residual 1.535 374 .004 
  
Total 1.616 379 
   
 





Constant size lev prof growth 
Variance proportions 
1 4.535 1.000 .00 .00 .01 .01 .01 
2 .759 2.444 .00 .00 .08 .25 .02 
3 .364 3.529 .00 .00 .10 .41 .43 
4 .262 4.162 .00 .00 .16 .05 .50 
5 .077 7.677 .01 .01 .50 .29 .03 




Table 8 - Correlations analysis 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Discretionary 
Accruals t 
1.000 .142 .014 -.017 .063 .089 
size t .142 1.000 .522 -.146 -.151 -.295 
leverage t .014 .522 1.000 -.077 -.089 -.415 
profitability t -.017 -.146 -.077 1.000 .337 .596 
growth t .063 -.151 -.089 .337 1.000 .420 
Z-score t .089 -.295 -.415 .596 .420 1.000 
Discretionary 
Accruals t 
.      
size t .003 .     
leverage t .393 .000 .    
profitability t .369 .002 .066 .   
growth t .110 .002 .042 .000 .  







Table 9 - Anova results Second regression model 
 
DAi,t = ß0 + ß1 Z SCOREi,t-1 + ß2 SIZEi,t + ß3 LEVERAGEi,t + ß4 PROFt + ß5 GROWTHt + εt  
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression .056 5 .011 2.685 .021c 
Residual 1.560 374 .004 
  
Total 1.616 379 
   
 
 
Table 10 - Model Summaryc 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
 .186b .035 .022 .06458073 
 
 





Constant size lev prof growth 
Variance proportions 
1 4.535 1.000 .00 .00 .01 .01 .01 
2 .759 2.444 .00 .00 .08 .25 .02 
3 .364 3.529 .00 .00 .10 .41 .43 
4 .262 4.162 .00 .00 .16 .05 .50 
5 .077 7.677 .01 .01 .50 .29 .03 





Table 12 - Residuals Statisticsa 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value -.0079449 .0562599 .0176430 .01215441 380 
Residual -.44826847 .28956553 .00000000 .06415332 380 
Std. Predicted Value -2.105 3.177 .000 1.000 380 
Std. Residual -6.941 4.484 .000 .993 380 
 
 
Table 13 - Descriptive statistics 
DAi,t = ß0 + ß1 Z SCOREi,t + ß2 FCi,t + ß3 [FC*Z SCORE]i,t + ß4 SIZEi,t + ß5 LEVERAGEi,t +    ß6 
PROF + ß7 GROWTH + εt  (3) 
 
Variables Mean  St.Deviation N 
Discretionary 
Accruals t 
.0176430 .06529455 380 
size t 14.4344 1.30562 380 
leverage t .1943 .14064 380 
profitability t 4.4442 6.70199 380 
growth t 1.7761 1.61723 380 
Z-score t 1.9813 1.29540 380 
Financial crisis 
dummy 
.4000 .49054 380 





Table 14 - ANOVA results Third regression model 
DAi,t = ß0 + ß1 Z SCOREi,t + ß2 FCi,t + ß3 [FC*Z SCORE]i,t + ß4 SIZEi,t + ß5 LEVERAGEi,t +    
ß6 PROF + ß7 GROWTH + εt  (3) 
Model Sum of Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
 Regression .101 7 .014 3.549 .001c 
Residual 1.515 372 .004   
Total 1.616 379    
 
Table 15 - Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
 .250b .063 .045 .06381005 
 
